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This paper considers the key policy issues related to liberalization of trade in financial services that the 
IMF should be concerned with, and the role the IMF has played in advising on policies related to trade 
in financial services in its bilateral and multilateral surveillance and conditionality attached to lending 
programs. IMF staff were generally aware of the literature and country experiences showing the 
benefits of financial liberalization. But Fund advice in support of liberalization can be best interpreted to 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
1.       Attention has focused especially in the past few years on the importance of issues 
concerning trade in services in light of the macroeconomic interests of the IMF. IMF (2005b) 
pointed to the critical role of services issues for competitiveness, the difficulties posed by 
limitations on the availability of data covering restrictions on services trade, and the indications 
that protection of service sectors is relatively high especially compared to that of manufactures.  
2.       In this context, this paper will describe/assess the following three broad issues: 
(i)  What key policy issues related to liberalization of trade in services should the IMF be 
concerned with, and on what existing standards of evidence should the IMF base its 
approach(es) to these issues?  
(ii)  What role has the IMF played in advising on policies related to trade in services in its 
bilateral and multilateral surveillance and in conditionality attached to lending programs?  
(iii)  What is the overall assessment of the IMF’s involvement in trade in services 
liberalization?  
3.        In considering services, an obvious starting point is to note the characteristics of 
services, which are that they are intangible, invisible, and perishable, requiring simultaneous 
production and consumption. Goods, in contrast, 
are tangible, visible, and storable, and hence do not 
require direct interaction between producers and 
consumers. An indication of the scope of services 
is provided in Box 1, which is based on the 
framework of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS)—a component of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). 
4.       It should be evident from the GATS 
categorization of services that, except for financial 
services, which will be the focus of this paper, 
most services do not come under the direct 
purview of the IMF and instead are subject to the 
rules and operational responsibilities of the WTO and the World Bank. This is not to say that 
nonfinancial services do not affect a country’s macroeconomic conditions and policies. Rather, 
the point is that such effects may be primarily indirect in character and better left to the other 
international institutions. 
Box 1. Scope of Services Covered in the GATS 
1. Business  services 
2. Communication  services 
3. Construction  services 
4. Distribution  services 
5. Educational  services 
6. Environmental  services 
7. Financial  services 
8.  Health-related and social services 
9.  Tourism and travel-related services 
10.  Recreational, cultural, and sporting services 
11. Transport  services 
12.  Other services not elsewhere included 
 6 
5.       The modes of delivery of international service transactions can be categorized as follows: 
•  Cross-border trade (Mode 1): services that are traded internationally across borders. An 
example is financial services provided by a bank in one country through mail or 
electronic means to a bank or consumers in another country. 
•  Consumption abroad (Mode 2): services that require the consumer to be in the location of 
the producer. Examples are when consumers from one country travel to another country 
to consume tourism or education services. 
•  Commercial presence (Mode 3): services that require commercial presence in the form of 
foreign direct investment. An example is a bank or insurance company owned by citizens 
of one country establishing a branch in another country. 
•  Presence of natural persons (Mode 4): services that require the temporary cross-border 
movement of workers. An example is the foreign employees of a foreign bank providing 
services on a temporary basis in a country. 
6.       A country’s financial services sector consists of users and providers of financial services 
and the government agencies that regulate them. Financial services are defined in the GATS 
Annex on Financial Services to include two broad categories of services: (i) insurance and 
insurance-related services and (ii) banking and other financial services, such as financial trading, 
asset management, brokerages, settlement and clearing services, provision of financial 
information, and advisory services.
1 
II.   LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN SERVICES: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES?
2 
A.   Measuring Restrictiveness 
7.       Barriers to trade interfere with the ability of firms from one country to compete with 
firms from another. This is true of trade in goods, where a tariff or nontariff barrier typically 
drives a wedge between the price of the good on the world market and its domestic price. This 
wedge, or tariff-equivalent, provides a convenient and often observable measure of the size of 
the impediment. In the case of services, however, such a simple measure is often not observable. 
Nonetheless, the concept of a tariff-equivalent is a useful way of quantifying a barrier to services 
trade even though it may be much harder to observe. 
8.       Since direct price comparisons of domestic and world prices of services are generally not 
observable, other means of inferring the presence and size of service barriers must be used. Some 
                                                 
1 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/10-anfin_e.htm.  
2 This section is adapted in part from Deardorff and Stern (2008), and draws on Gootiiz and Mattoo (2008). 7 
of these methods are direct, in asking governments or participants in services markets what 
barriers they impose or face. Though the answers they yield are usually only qualitative, 
indicating the presence or absence of a particular barrier but not its quantitative size or effect, 
such qualitative information takes on a quantitative dimension when tabulated by sector, perhaps 
with subjective weights to indicate severity. The result is a set of frequency measures of barriers 
to trade, recording what the barriers are and where. 
9.       An example of the foregoing type of measure is provided in Gootiiz and Mattoo (2008), 
who surveyed actual or applied trade policies in services for the World Bank in 2007 covering 32 
developing countries and 24 OECD countries and the four modes of supplying financial services 
(banking and insurance), telecommunications, retail distribution, transport, and professional 
services.
3 For each sector and mode of supply, the openness of policy towards foreign suppliers 
was mapped on a 5-point scale, ranging from no restrictions to highly restricted. The sector 
results were aggregated across modes of supply, based on weights reflecting judgments of the 
relative importance of the different modes. Sector restrictiveness indices were then aggregated 
using sector GDP shares, and country income-group indices were aggregated using GDP weights 
for the component countries. 
10.       The 2007 World Bank survey contained a number of specific questions on the different 
services and modes.
4 For example, with regard to financial (banking) services, mode 3 
(establishing commercial presence), the survey asked (i) for greenfield investments, whether 
foreign banks were permitted to enter as a branch or as a locally incorporated subsidiary; (ii) for 
entry through acquisition or joint ventures, whether foreign banks could enter the market by 
acquiring part or all of a local private bank, state-owned bank, or joint venture; the maximum 
ownership permitted to a single foreign bank; the maximum aggregate foreign investment 
permitted; and whether a foreign bank could acquire the controlling stake; (iii) if a license was 
required to establish commercial presence; whether the criteria to obtain a license were publicly 
available; whether fulfillment of the criteria would ensure that a license was granted; whether the 
licensing criteria differed between foreign and domestic banks; if the number of licenses was 
fixed, whether this restriction applied only to foreign banks, and on what basis the licenses 
would be allocated. Other survey questions that related to banking services addressed regulation, 
treatment of foreign banks that have a commercial presence, and cross-border trade. A similar set 
of questions covered the various forms of insurance services. 
                                                 
3 The sectors were further disaggregated into banking (retail and merchant), insurance (life, nonlife, and 
reinsurance), road transport, railway shipping, maritime shipping and auxiliary services, air transport (freight and 
passengers), accounting, auditing, and legal services.  
4 The questionnaires are available on the World Bank’s website: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTTRADERES
EARCH/0,,contentMDK:20540747~menuPK:791346~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:544849~isC
URL:Y,00.html.  8 
11.       As of March 2009, the detailed country results were not yet available. But from the 
aggregated results reported in Gootiiz and Mattoo (2008) it seems that, on the whole, trade in 
financial services was relatively restricted, particularly in non-OECD countries. Thus, the 
liberalization of trade in financial services may be disproportionately a developing 
country/emerging market issue.  
12.       Deardorff and Stern (2008) provide illustrations of the specific restrictions applied to 
banking services and the calculation of restrictiveness indexes for several developing and 
industrial countries, based on the work of McGuire and Schuele (2000). They also review studies 
of this type for a number of other sectors and provide a conceptual discussion and illustrations of 
price-impact and quantity-impact measurements and econometric specifications and estimation, 
estimates of services barriers based on gravity models, and financial-based measurements. In 
addition, they discuss how tariff-equivalent and price-impact estimates of services barriers can 
be incorporated into computational general equilibrium models in order to analyze the economy-
wide effects of these barriers. Finally, they set forth a number of principles and recommended 
empirical procedures for measuring services barriers and for assessing the consequences of their 
liberalization (Box 2).  
13.       The survey work being conducted by the World Bank together with the presentation and 
illustrations of methodologies for the measurement of services barriers (Deardorff and Stern, 
2008) suggest that it would be feasible for Fund staff to undertake the measurement of financial 
services barriers and/or to carry out econometric analysis of the economic effects of these 
barriers and the benefits from liberalization for a number of IMF members. Because it would be 
necessary to construct measures of existing financial services barriers for individual countries, 
such analysis would be best suited for inclusion in the Selected Issues Papers (SIPs) for 
Article IV consultations. 
B.    Liberalization of Financial Services and the Capital Account 
14.       Liberalizing financial services essentially involves deregulating domestic policies and 
institutions. There are several dimensions to the regulatory process, including: the withdrawal of 
government intervention through, for example, privatizing state-owned banks, freeing key prices 
like interest rates to be market-determined, and removing restrictions on the activities that banks 
can offer. A further dimension is the strengthening of domestic financial institutions and 
markets, so as to increase the efficiency with which funds are channeled from depositors and 
investors to borrowers and issuers.  
15.       More particularly, the liberalization of financial services refers to the removal of 
quantitative or qualitative regulations that limit (domestic or foreign) market entry or foreign 
commercial presence or that involve relatively high costs of doing business and as a result 
effectively make foreign entry unprofitable. Changes in host-country regulations that liberalize 
domestic financial markets can facilitate greater cross-border trade in financial services and the 
entry of foreign financial services providers under modes 1-4 as applied to financial services. 9 
Box 2. Principles and Recommended Procedures for Measuring Services Barriers and for Assessing the 
Consequences of their Liberalization
1  
Principles: 
1.  Most barriers to trade and investment in services take the form of domestic regulations, rather than measures at 
the border.  
2.  No single methodology is sufficient for documenting and measuring barriers to trade in services. Instead, 
investigators need to draw upon all available information, including both direct observation of particular 
barriers and indirect inference of barriers using data on prices and quantities.  
3.  Because of the special role of incumbent firms in many service industries, regulations do not need to be 
explicitly discriminatory against foreign firms in order to have discriminatory effects.  
Procedures: 
1.  Collect the details of domestic regulations and related policies affecting services firms in the countries, 
including the manner in which they apply to foreign versus domestic firms, plus quantitative details of their 
application, such as any percentage or dollar limits that they impose. (Ideally, this information should be 
collected by systematic surveys of governments and/or firms. However, it may also be possible to infer it less 
directly from documents prepared for other purposes, such as the commitments that governments made to the 
GATS in the Uruguay Round and subsequent negotiations.)  
2.  For each type of regulation or policy, define degrees of restrictiveness and assign scores to each, ranging from 
zero for least restrictive to one for most restrictive.  
3.  Construct a measure of restrictiveness by weighting the scores from step 2 based on judgments of the relative 
importance of each policy using a statistical methodology such as factor analysis to identify the weights or by 
designing proxy measures, such as dummy variables, to represent particular restrictions. The resulting measures 
can then be used for reporting the presence and importance of barriers across industries and countries, as well as 
for providing an input to subsequent analysis.  
4.  Convert the measures of restrictiveness from step 3 into a set of tariff-equivalents by one or more of the 
following methods:  
(a)  Assign judgmental tariff-equivalent values to each of the component measures, representing the percentage 
taxes on foreign suppliers to which each component is thought to correspond at their most restrictive levels. 
(b)  Use data on prices and their determinants as the basis for a regression model that includes an index or other 
measures of restrictiveness and that estimates the effect on prices.  
(c)  Use data on quantities produced or traded as the basis for a regression model that includes an index or other 
measures of restrictiveness and that estimates the effect on quantities. This estimate can then be converted 
to tariff-equivalents using an assumed or estimated price elasticity of demand.  
5.  Use an index or other measures of restrictiveness or the tariff equivalents constructed above as inputs into a 
model of production and trade in order to ascertain the effects of changes in the barriers to which they 
correspond. The appropriate model for this purpose depends on whether sectoral or economy-wide policy 
changes are to be analyzed. For economy-wide policy changes, the model should be a general equilibrium one, 
incorporating the full effects of barriers across sectors and countries. 
___________________________ 
1Source: Deardorff and Stern (2008). 
 
16.       Trade in financial services also entails certain GATS obligations with regard to ensuring 
transparency of regulatory measures, adhering to nondiscrimination according to the most 
favored nation principle; and making commitments to provide for market access and national 
treatment for foreign services providers. GATS commitments are not intended to compromise 
the ability of governments to pursue sound regulatory and macroeconomic policies. In particular, 
GATS commitments allow considerable freedom to achieve such domestic economic objectives 
as prudential regulation and macroeconomic policy.
  10 
17.       Once a country has made formal commitments with regard to liberalizing trade in 
financial services, the IMF is constrained to avoid advising the country authorities to liberalize 
slower or less (except for prudential reasons) though the IMF can advise the authorities to 
liberalize faster or more. Country commitments under the GATS may constrain IMF options for 
advising member countries on liberalization of trade in financial services. Such constraints will 
depend on the extent to which individual countries may have limited the opening of their 
financial sectors in the context of the liberalization that was to be undertaken in the Uruguay 
Round. Also, countries engaged in the process of WTO accession are often requested by other 
WTO members to implement liberalization covering various aspects of their financial services at 
different intervals of time. The WTO accession process may therefore constrain the advice on 
financial liberalization that the IMF may offer to member countries.  
18.       Policy reforms that free up the cross-border supply of financial services and market entry 
for foreign financial services providers are likely eventually to require loosening of restrictions 
on at least some forms of capital flows. This interrelationship often raises fears about the impact 
of increased competition, loss of autonomy, and the potential increased volatility of capital 
flows.
5 The interaction between capital controls and opening the market to foreign financial 
services providers arises when domestic financial services transactions involve international 
capital account transactions. While it is possible for some international transactions in financial 
services to take place without cross-border capital flows, the presence of capital controls may 
substantially reduce the freedom of firms and households to buy financial services more cheaply 
from more diversified sources of funds. This may in turn discourage foreign services providers 
from entering an economy. Opening the capital account, therefore, although a distinct issue from 
that of financial services policy reform, will sooner or later become an issue to be faced.  
19.       In principle, domestic regulatory reform and services liberalization can be seen as 
precursors of capital account liberalization. A sound and diverse financial system will better 
intermediate volatile international capital flows. But there may not be a one-size-fits-all approach 
to sequencing financial services liberalization and capital account liberalization.
6 It is important 
in any event to note that GATS commitments may not oblige a country to allow international 
capital mobility, and the Fund may wish to exercise caution in pressing for open capital accounts 
in view of the potential volatility of capital flows. 
                                                 
5 See Ocampo and Stiglitz (2008) and the IMF publications and working papers in Annex Tables A1.3 and A3.1 for 
discussions of the liberalization experiences of a number of emerging market economies. 
6 If a country fully liberalizes its capital account in an atmosphere of macroeconomic instability and/or poor banking 
regulation and supervision, it may be more vulnerable to crises. Conversely, if a country uses capital controls to 
achieve prudential regulation, its financial system may remain weak. Argentina and Thailand are examples of 
countries that fully liberalized their financial systems, including their capital accounts, in an atmosphere of 
macroeconomic instability (Argentina) and poor bank regulation and supervision (Thailand). In contrast, India has 
demonstrated a cautious, phased approach to capital account liberalization.  11 
C.   Benefits and Costs of Financial Liberalization  
20.       While the current international financial turmoil strongly suggests some serious problems 
in the functioning and efficacy of financial institutions in many countries, it is important not to 
lose sight of the potential benefits that may be realized from financial services liberalization. 
These costs and benefits have been identified in a growing literature, a representative sample of 
which is provided in Annex 3, Table A3.2. The remainder of this section summarizes salient 
conclusions for IMF work.  
21.       Some of the benefits of liberalization of trade in financial services involve 
macroeconomic outcomes and overall financial sector issues that fall within the purview of the 
IMF:
7 
•  The prospect of financial liberalization may provide a catalyst for domestic reform by 
creating a constituency for improved regulation and supervision, better disclosure rules, 
and an improved legal and regulatory framework that can be put into place before foreign 
institutions are permitted to operate in the country. 
•  The prospect of financial liberalization may also provide a catalyst for greater regulatory 
transparency and strong prudential supervision by making information about laws, 
regulations, and administrative guidelines more readily available to all current and 
prospective market participants, including both domestic and foreign financial 
institutions. 
•  The robustness of the domestic financial system to shocks may be enhanced by foreign 
banks that can draw on their parent organizations if additional funding and capital are 
needed. 
•  Access to international capital may be facilitated and the amount of saving available for 
productive investment augmented. 
22.       Other potential benefits appear to fit more into the mandate of the World Bank: 
•  Increased domestic competition may improve the quality of services and widen the range 
of choice, in the form of access to new services channels, faster access to services, better 
credit assessment procedures and information gathering techniques, wider choice of 
products and vendors, and easier and more effective diversification of risk. 
                                                 
7 Several IMF publications pick up on many of these issues, including IMF (2000a) especially Chapter VI 
(“The Role of Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets”); IMF (2007a) especially Chapter III (“The Globalization of 
Financial Institutions and Its Implications for Financial Stability”); and IMF (2007b) especially Chapter 3 
(“Sustaining Financial Development in Emerging Europe”). Also see Annexes 1 and 3 below. 12 
•  New skills, products, and technologies may be diffused into the domestic financial 
system, assisting its modernization. 
23.       By the same token, financial-services liberalization may entail certain economic risks and 
uncertainties:
8 
•  Liberalization may not yield a more stable source of credit for domestic borrowers. If 
foreign bank entry is accompanied by reduced barriers to capital outflows, banks may use 
funds raised in the domestic market to undertake external lending so that domestic 
borrowers may not have the same degree of access to domestic savings as before 
liberalization. Another risk is that foreign banks might shift funds abruptly from one 
market to another as they perceive changes in risk-adjusted returns. In particular, internet 
banking may be a source of instability as financial turmoil in one country may have 
significant spillover effects in other countries. 
•  Especially in the early stages of liberalization, foreign banks may “cherry-pick” the most 
desirable markets and customers, leaving the domestic banks with higher-risk assets and 
customers. Foreign banks may only service profitable market segments, leaving aside 
retail banking in rural areas 
•  Foreign banks are perhaps more likely to “cut and run” during financial crises. 
•  Depending on the banking structure, foreign banks may encourage the development of 
oligopolistic, rather than competitive, banking structures. 
•  Foreign banks may not guarantee safety and soundness, especially if they have 
questionable ownership links with other international banks and are not subject to close 
monitoring in the host country.  
•  Establishing clarity in how foreign banks or banking service providers are supervised is 
highly complex owing to differing supervision practices for foreign-owned subsidiaries, 
branches of foreign banks, and banking services provided by foreign banks. These 
differences create scope for regulatory arbitrage, regulatory overlap, and imprecise 
boundaries between the domestic and foreign accounts and activities of banks. 
                                                 
8 In addition to considering the potential economic benefits and costs of foreign banking, it is important to consider 
their social impact. Foreign banks may not give priority to issues of poverty alleviation and the access of 
low-income and rural-based savers and borrowers to financial services. 13 
D.   Fund Guidance and Advising for Financial Liberalization 
24.       The foregoing discussion suggests that the IMF needs to consider a number of key issues 
when countries are planning to reduce or remove barriers to trade in financial services or when 
financial services markets may already be open to varying degrees:  
•  The adequacy and transparency of existing and prospective regulation of the financial 
sector. 
•  The stability of sources of credit to host-country financial institutions and residents, 
including in times of crisis. 
•  Effects of financial liberalization on the structure, stability, and efficiency of banking or 
the financial sector more generally. 
•  The risks that foreign institutions may cherry-pick the most desirable markets and 
customers. 
•  The adequacy and clarity of supervision of financial institutions operating across national 
borders. 
25.       There are further considerations that the IMF should take into account in its advisory 
capacity to member countries: 
•  The need for adequate data on restrictions on trade in financial services, taking into 
account difficulties in collecting and interpreting such data.  
•  The development and implementation of partial and general equilibrium models that take 
account of the country’s major sectoral characteristics. This would require the 
construction of comprehensive databases; estimation of the pertinent parameters that 
reflect the responses of economic agents to the reduction and/or elimination of financial 
services barriers in a global context; and assessment of changes in economic welfare 
resulting from liberalization of trade in financial services. 
•  For IMF members that are parties to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that cover their 
financial services sectors, modeling efforts should be adapted to reflect the potential 
impacts of the preferential existence or removal of financial services barriers, including 
the effects on financial services trade and associated changes in the economic welfare of 
PTA members and nonmembers.
9 
                                                 
9 In this connection, see Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2007); and Hoekman (2008). 14 
III.   IMF INVOLVEMENT IN LIBERALIZATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES TRADE ISSUES 
26.       This section addresses the role that the IMF has played in advising on policies related to 
the liberalization of financial services trade in its bilateral and multilateral surveillance and in 
conditionality attached to lending programs. The analysis is based on official reports, 
background papers, and other source materials provided by the IEO evaluation team for a 
selected set of economies chosen by the IEO. The focus is on the way that IMF missions may 
have helped countries prepare for liberalization and how good or appropriate the IMF’s advice 
was on the scope and pace of liberalization per se. The country studies are therefore intended to 
illustrate when the IMF played an appropriate and useful role, and when it fell short of the role it 
could or should have played. Conclusions will be drawn as to whether the IMF approach to 
financial services trade liberalization during the evaluation period, 1996 to 2007, seems to have 
been well thought out and broadly consistent with best practice.  
A.   Evolution of Article IV Surveillance of Trade in Financial Services  
27.       Before turning to the country studies, it is useful to provide a broad overview of the 
record of the IMF’s advice across its entire membership through bilateral surveillance and 
program conditionality on financial services trade liberalization. Annex 1 analyzes 
systematically the IMF’s advice in the area of trade in financial services, based on a review of 
Article IV staff reports for three years: 1996, 2000, and 2006. The results (Annex Table A1.1) 
are intended to serve as proxy to represent the whole evaluation period, 1996 to 2007.  
28.       Although Executive Board guidance in 2002 encouraged greater surveillance of trade in 
services, in view of its increasing significance and the impact of services trade negotiations on 
the role and mission of the Fund (IMF, 2002a), trade in financial services did not receive a great 
deal of advisory attention from IMF staff during the evaluation period (Annex Table A1.1). 
Thus, more than four-fifths of the staff reports for the three discrete years 1996, 2000, and 2006 
were either silent on issues on trade in financial services or simply provided a factual description 
without any accompanying staff advice or recommendations. Nonetheless, there is evidence of 
gradual improvement: though in 1996 almost 90 percent of the staff reports in 1996 contained no 
reference to issues of trade in financial services, by 2006 this proportion had fallen closer to 80 
percent.  
29.       The comparative dearth of advice on trade in services in the Article IV surveillance 
reports may reflect the lack of guidance on the framework for assessing the appropriate pace and 
scope of financial services trade liberalization and coordination with financial liberalization in 
general. This contrasts with the rather clear advice and recommendations with regard to the 
reform of merchandise trade policies. Fund advice on financial services liberalization issued 
through the Article IV reports mostly related to the encouragement of market competition by 
means of greater participation of foreign financial institutions but was rarely accompanied by 
systematic analysis and supporting data. 15 
B.   Country Case Studies 
30.       Four country cases are examined: China, India, Italy, and Tajikistan.
10 These countries 
were chosen because they undertook a significant liberalization of trade in financial services 
during the evaluation period. This section examines the role the IMF played in providing advice 
on their liberalization. The sources provided by the IEO for the country studies consisted 
primarily of staff reports and SIPs for Article IV consultations; Financial System Stability 
Assessment (FSSA) reports of Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) missions; staff 
reports and other documents related to IMF-supported programs; IMF Executive Board minutes; 
WTO trade policy reviews; and media reports from Factiva.  
China 
31.       The staff reports, SIPs, and Board minutes for China’s Article IV consultations during 
1996–2007 concentrated primarily on macroeconomic and related issues, though some attention 
was also given to issues of trade in financial services. Perhaps the most prominent of these were 
the terms related to trade in financial services of China’s 2001 WTO accession. Reports also 
considered policies indirectly related to trade in financial services—banking and capital market 
reforms designed to strengthen supervision, improve the efficiency of banking intermediation, 
and financial restructuring especially of the large state-owned commercial banks.  
32.       During the earlier part of the evaluation period, a recurring theme in IMF advice to China 
on financial sector reforms was the need to enhance competition in the banking sector, including 
by opening the sector to foreigners. IMF missions suggested gradually increasing access to 
renminbi business for foreign banks (IMF, 1997b), allowing new entry of foreign and domestic 
banks (subject to appropriate safeguards), and allowing outside (including foreign) investors to 
purchase shares in state-owned commercial banks (IMF, 1998b; 1999b). The Chinese authorities 
responded that an extension of the role of foreign banks was under consideration in the WTO 
accession negotiations (IMF, 1999b). They considered—and IMF staff concurred—that the 
WTO agreement would provide an impetus to domestic commercial banks to accelerate their 
restructuring efforts and enhance competition in the banking system (IMF, 2000c).
11 A 2000 SIP 
(Robinson, Dorsey, and Zebregs, 2000) on the potential sectoral impact of China’s WTO 
accession noted that for the financial sector, the reforms represented “potentially enormous 
changes”: foreign financial institutions would be permitted to provide services without client 
restrictions for foreign currency business upon accession, local currency services to Chinese 
                                                 
10 Country case studies for Algeria, Thailand, Ukraine, and Vietnam are available on request. 
11 Outside the Fund staff, Langlois (2001), and Crosby (2008) review China’s banking reforms and WTO accession 
commitments on financial services. While both authors view China’s WTO commitments in a positive and 
promising light in permitting greater foreign bank entry, they note that there may be significant impediments to 
foreign entry, depending on how the Chinese authorities view their WTO commitments and the manner in which 
disagreements and disputes about entry are addressed by China and other WTO members.  16 
companies within two years, and services to all Chinese clients within five years. The paper 
noted that the main risk to domestic banks was that their best borrowers would migrate to foreign 
banks but that on the other hand—based on the experience of transition economies in Eastern 
Europe—liberalization had the potential to give foreign banks access to domestic currency and 
Chinese banks access to foreign bank know-how and additional capital. 
33.       After China acceded to the WTO in 2001, the Chinese authorities and the IMF missions 
turned their attention to banking reforms for ensuring future financial stability and creating 
sound domestic banks that would be able to adequately compete after 2006 when the banking 
sector was to be fully open to foreign participation. IMF staff welcomed the authorities’ 
increased attention to bank supervision, recommended additional steps to improve the internal 
operations of (domestic) banks such as improving risk management and controls and upgrading 
accounting systems (IMF, 2003b), and reiterated the point that “[d]iversifying bank ownership, 
for example by allowing qualified foreign financial institutions to take strategic stakes... could 
bring much needed technical expertise and better governance” (IMF, 2005c; and IMF, 2004a; 
2006c).
12  
34.       In the years leading up to the 2006 liberalization, IMF staff noted that the state-owned 
commercial banks continued to be the major part of the banking system, while the share of 
foreign-funded banks was comparatively small, with foreign ownership shares being limited and 
foreign management control practically nonexistent (Podpiera, 2005). China’s financial sector 
operations thus contrasted with those of several other former centrally planned economies that 
had carried out major financial sector reforms involving sharply reduced state control over banks 
during the mid- to late-1990s, selling majority stakes to foreign private owners (Aitken, 2005).  
35.       A 2006 SIP (Leigh and Podpiera, 2006) addressed the contribution of foreign investors to 
improving banking services in China. While foreign banks’ direct participation in China (through 
their own branches and subsidiaries) was relatively small, their indirect participation as minority 
shareholders had grown rapidly, to the point that almost all major Chinese banks now had a 
foreign strategic investor. The paper concluded that the overall contribution of foreign investors 
in improving the core operations of China’s banks had been limited as foreign investors lacked 
sufficient incentives and opportunities—their ownership shares were relatively small and their 
management involvement minimal.
13 As this form of foreign investor entry into the banking 
                                                 
(continued…) 
12 A 2004 SIP (Baldwin and Barnett, 2004) reviewed the international experience of bank restructuring with 
reference especially to reform of China’s state-owned commercial banks and drew four main lessons: “(i) time-
bound restructuring plans are essential for ensuring successful bank reforms; (ii) banks should have a strong 
commercial orientation, sound corporate governance framework, and freedom from political interference; 
(iii) reform should be guided by a comprehensive bank restructuring strategy that, among other things, identifies 
which agency will lead the reform program; and (iv) the market environment should be conducive to sound banking 
practices, which may require complementary legal, tax, and corporate sector reforms.” No reference was made to the 
potential role of foreign bank entry in the process of reform. 
13 Foreign investors had: (i) increased bank capital, even though some of the investment went to the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange as foreign investors partly bought existing shares; (ii) provided credibility 17 
sector (with foreign banks taking only a minority stake in domestic banks rather than taking a 
controlling stake or entering as fully-owned subsidiaries) was “fairly unique” to China, the paper 
noted that it was difficult to extrapolate from international experience what effects foreign 
investors may eventually have on the performance of Chinese banks.
14  
36.       In summary, the evolution of the opening of China’s financial sector to the entry of 
foreign banks was largely predetermined by China’s WTO accession commitments, while the 
IMF documents reviewed focused primarily on macroeconomic and related issues, including 
financial sector reforms more broadly. The IMF did point out the potential benefits to China of 
foreign bank entry, but this recognition was mainly qualitative, drawing in general terms on the 
experiences of other former centrally planned and emerging market economies. None of the 
issues mentioned in Section II above that might have guided the Fund’s advice on financial 
liberalization was addressed systematically, no studies identified and measured the specific 
barriers to China’s financial liberalization were prepared, and no assessment was presented of the 
potential economic benefits to be derived from the reduction or removal of existing financial 
sector barriers. Potentially much could have been gained if Fund staff had carried out explicit 
analysis of the terms and potential economic effects of China’s WTO accession agreements. 
India  
37.       Following India’s unilateral policy reforms in 1991–92, the process of allowing private 
domestic and foreign banks to enter or expand operations in the state-bank-dominated Indian 
market was slow. It was official Indian government policy to give Indian public banks more 
breathing room vis-à-vis foreign banks until 2009 when full national treatment for wholly owned 
foreign banks would take effect. 
38.       IMF surveillance missions quite consistently pointed to the potential benefits of 
privatization and foreign entry into India’s financial sector, stressing that “increasing the private 
sector’s role in bank management offered the best prospects for achieving a fundamental 
improvement in the banks’ operating efficiency” (IMF, 1997c) and that a “much greater private 
sector opening” was urgently needed “to avoid further burdening the public debt outlook, as well 
as to improving bank governance and market discipline” (IMF, 1998c). The Indian authorities 
were hesitant, noting that “obtaining private capital—including foreign equity—will require far-
reaching changes in management and public control” (IMF, 1998c). However, they agreed to 
continue licensing new domestic private banks and foreign banks, and to consider allowing 
foreign banks to compete on a level playing field with domestic banks (IMF, 1998c). A 1998 SIP 
                                                                                                                                                             
needed to launch relatively large initial public offerings; (iii) induced improvements in corporate governance and 
management, with some board seats and management positions going to the foreign investors; and (iv) provided 
limited technical assistance (Leigh and Podpiera, 2006). 
14 The paper included a summary of the literature on the impact of foreign bank entry and a brief survey of selected 
country experience with foreign investment in domestic banks (Malaysia, Korea, Central and Eastern Europe, and 
Latin America). 18 
(Callen, 1998) noted that some private and foreign banks had entered the sector between 1993 
and 1998 and cited evidence that these banks were more profitable and less concentrated than 
India’s public sector banks.  
39.       Incremental steps toward financial services liberalization were taken in 2001. In January 
of that year, the Indian authorities released a long-delayed comprehensive program of “second-
generation” reforms prepared by the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council. The 
Council’s report covered a broad range of recommendations, including financial sector reforms 
such as opening the insurance sector to private sector entrants—subject to minimum capital 
requirements and a 26 percent cap on foreign ownership—and introducing legislation to reduce 
the minimum government shareholding in public sector banks from 51 percent to 33 percent. In 
the latter regard, according to Towe (2001), the report cautioned that the Indian government’s 
desire to retain the “public sector character of public sector banks” could undermine the benefits 
that would accrue from increasing competition in the banking sector. The same argument was 
also made in the IMF’s 2000 Article IV consultation report (IMF, 2000b) and in the joint 
IMF-World Bank FSSA report (IMF, 2001a).
15 
40.       Subsequent IMF Article IV missions tracked India’s progress in opening its financial 
sector and reducing the government’s ownership and control of public sector banks. A 2002 SIP 
(Koeva, 2002) presented evidence that the entry of new foreign and domestic banks had led to a 
reduction in banking industry concentration between 1990/91 and 2000/01 and with it, a 
significant decline in bank intermediation costs and profitability.
16 IMF staff consistently pressed 
the Indian authorities to do more to relinquish effective control of public sector banks to private 
shareholders. Besides reducing the government’s share in public sector banks, IMF staff urged 
the Indian authorities to raise the foreign direct investment limit in private banks and to lift the 
10 percent limit on voting rights in a bank (IMF, 2003a; 2004b; 2005d).  
41.       In early 2005, the Indian authorities announced a few more incremental reforms—foreign 
banks would be allowed to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries and legislation would be 
amended to eliminate the 10 percent cap on the voting rights of foreign banks—but stated that 
they would defer further liberalization considerations to 2009. The 2005 IMF Article IV staff 
                                                 
15 In the staff report for the 2000 Article IV consultation with India, the IMF mission urged the authorities to reduce 
the minimum government shareholding in public sector banks because it would “facilitate needed improvements in 
governance and efficiency in the banking sector” and cautioned that “these objectives as well as private sector 
interest in equity participation, could be undermined by the government’s statement that the public sector 
characteristic of banks and their employees would be protected” (IMF, 2000b). The FSSA report noted: “Introducing 
private capital participation, while seeking to maintain ‘the public sector character’ of banks, is a source of concern” 
(IMF, 2001a). 
16 An econometric study by staff of the Office of the IMF Executive Director for India concluded that during  
1996–2004, the Indian banking industry operated under competitive conditions and earned revenues as if under 
monopolistic competition and hence that “the competitive nature of the Indian banking system [was] not 
significantly different from the banking system in other countries” (Prasad and Ghosh, 2005). 19 
report called for bringing forward the 2009 target date for some liberalization measures. The 
report noted that foreign presence in the Indian banking system (as captured by balance sheet 
data) was lower than in some other emerging Asian countries, and significantly lower than in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe, and cited empirical studies (e.g., IMF, 2000a) on the benefits 
to be derived from competition by foreign banks (IMF, 2005d). But subsequent IMF missions 
did not press the issue. 
42.       In 2009, as planned, the Indian authorities released a major and comprehensive report on 
financial sector reform (Government of India, Planning Commission, 2009). This report set out a 
series of proposals recommending the sale of underperforming public-sector banks, allowing 
takeovers and mergers between public and private Indian banks and foreign banks, permitting 
domestic and foreign banks to set up branches and automated teller machines anywhere in the 
country, and adopting other measures that would bring about competition and improve service 
and prices of financial services for Indian firms and consumers. 
43.       Overall, during most of the evaluation period, the IMF advised in favor of increased 
financial liberalization in India, including both privatization and the entry of foreign banks. At 
the same time, the Indian authorities have instituted policy reforms since 1991/92 that resulted in 
(a slow process of) privatization and entry of foreign banks. The Fund’s recommendations for 
India’s financial liberalization were mainly qualitative and with no supporting studies of how the 
process of liberalization might be best designed and implemented. While it is not clear how 
much of a role the Fund’s advice played in the authorities’ 2009 blueprint for the continuing 
reform measures, the broad thrust of the proposed reforms seems to be in line with the IMF’s 
advice. 
Italy 
44.       The IMF paid very little attention to trade in financial services issues in Italy in the earlier 
part of the evaluation period. Article IV staff reports during 1997–99 called for further 
privatization and increased labor market flexibility to improve performance in the banking sector 
in the face of intensified competition under the European Monetary Union (IMF, 1997a; 1998a; 
1999a), but did not suggest enhancing competition through greater participation in the financial 
sector by foreign banks.  
45.       The IMF’s attention to trade in financial services issues in Italy stepped up beginning in 
2003. In that year, the staff report put forth the view that the consolidation, privatization, and 
improvements in risk management in recent years had helped to strengthen the financial position 
of banks and insurance firms and that “[s]ecuring additional efficiency gains while maintaining 
competitive pressures [was] likely to require further consolidation and eventually greater cross-
border penetration by financial institutions (in Italy, as elsewhere in Europe)” (IMF, 2003c). A 
subsequent process of banking consolidation was actively encouraged by the Bank of Italy to 
establish the basis for greater competition at the EU level. The 2004 staff report noted that this 
consolidation had indeed significantly changed the characteristics of the banking system: it was 20 
now essentially private and the number of banks had fallen by one-third since 1990, though the 
number of branches had increased by some 80 percent (IMF, 2005a).  
46.       The 2004 Article IV mission observed that “competition could be further enhanced 
through increased involvement of foreign banks, but that—as elsewhere in continental Europe—
cross-border mergers and acquisitions had been limited, a fact many analysts attributed to the 
opposition of the domestic supervisory authorities” (IMF, 2005a). IMF staff also reported that an 
amendment had been proposed to the draft savings law that would transfer responsibility for 
banking system competition from the Bank of Italy to the antitrust authority, but that its timing 
and final content were uncertain (IMF, 2005a).  
47.       During 2004-05, a number of media reports observed that Antonio Fazio, the Bank of 
Italy governor, had “firmly resisted foreign interest in Italian banks, even though there [was] 
more foreign capital invested in minority stakes in Italian banks than any other European 
banking system.”
17 Italy’s fragmented banking system led the European Commission to call on 
Italy’s central bank to declare publicly its commitment to an open and competitive banking 
sector that did not freeze out foreign players. This underscored growing concerns of the Brussels 
regulator and some European banks that Italy’s financial sector was not sufficiently open to 
takeovers and investments from non-Italian banks.
18 
48.       An IMF FSAP mission in 2005 also noted that the presence of foreign banks was very 
limited in retail banking and that foreign takeovers had proven difficult to carry out. It 
recommended that “[g]reater foreign ownership in the Italian retail banking sector would help 
strengthen efficiency” (IMF, 2006b).
19 A SIP for the 2005 Article IV consultation (Drummond, 
Maechler, and Marcelino, 2006) addressed competition in Italy’s banking system and provided 
evidence that Italy’s banking system remained fragmented, was relatively small, and was less 
efficient than banking systems of other EU countries.
20 However, the Bank of Italy “expressed 
skepticism about the need for an increased foreign presence in the banking system, noting that 
                                                 
17 “Italian banking arrives at brink of a wave.” Financial Times, January 27, 2004. 
18 “Commission puts pressure on Italian banks,” Financial Times, February 8, 2005; “Italian bank governor denies 
protectionism,” Financial Times, February 18, 2005; “Italy: The kiss of death?” Economist Intelligence Unit, 
August 1, 2005; “Brussels accuses Fazio of violating ‘spirit’ of rules,” Financial Times, September 17, 2005; 
“EU challenges Italy on bank deals,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2005.  
19 A FSAP was completed for Italy in July 2005 and the findings were discussed with the Italian authorities during 
the Article IV consultation in November of that year. The FSSA report concluded that Italy’s financial system was 
generally sound, that potential conflicts of interest arising from the Bank of Italy’s governance structure had been 
addressed by a new savings law, and that measures had been taken to help reorient the Italian financial system away 
from a predominantly relationship-based system that tended to favor incumbents over new entrants (IMF, 2006b). 
20 The paper did not find a link between foreign ownership and banks’ efficiency in its six-country sample (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States), suggesting that “foreign penetration in these 
countries remains too low to significantly modify the dynamics in the respective banking sectors” (Drummond, 
Maechler, and Marcelino, 2006). 21 
the share of the system owned by foreign entities was already comparatively high (albeit 
consisting only of minority positions)” (IMF, 2006a). 
49.       Noting that recent controversies over the conduct of the Bank of Italy in responding to 
two cross-border bank takeover bids were negatively affecting perceptions of the contestability 
of the Italian banking system and eroding confidence in Italian institutional arrangements, IMF 
staff urged the central bank to shift responsibility for competition to another authority 
(IMF, 2006a). There was some resistance to this suggestion—Bank of Italy representatives 
argued that other central banks were also jointly entrusted with responsibility for competition 
and stability—but in mid-December 2005, the Italian government amended the savings law to 
give the Bank of Italy and the antitrust authority joint responsibility for bank mergers and 
acquisitions and to transfer responsibility for other anticompetitive behavior fully to the antitrust 
authority (IMF, 2006a). Governor Fazio resigned as central bank governor shortly thereafter. 
50.       The 2006 Article IV mission noted that appreciable progress had been made in 
implementing the recommendations of the FSAP, particularly in banking-market contestability 
but that further progress was needed in reducing bank costs. It also noted that the new leadership 
of the Bank of Italy supported banking sector consolidation, with tangible results, and that the 
new joint oversight of merger activity by the Bank of Italy and the antitrust authority was 
proceeding smoothly (IMF, 2007c).  
51.       Improvements in the business environment, the increasing efficiency of the banking 
system, and the encouraging attitude of the Bank of Italy may have been a factor in the greater 
number of mergers in 2006 than in the previous five years. While some of the changes noted may 
have been in response to Fund advice and recommendations, the pressures from the European 
Commission and the Italian government were most likely the decisive influences in promoting 
financial liberalization. 
52.       In sum, the IMF’s attention to trade in financial services issues in Italy emerged gradually 
after 2003. Fund surveillance then pointed to the limited pace of cross-border consolidation in 
the banking system, though it did not give the issue a great deal of prominence. After the change 
of leadership of the Bank of Italy in 2005, the Fund’s activity stepped up with the completion of 
an FSAP. Some of the subsequent changes in the structure of the banking system may have been 
in response to Fund advice and recommendations, but it appears that pressures from the EU 
Commission and Italian Government officials to remove Governor Fazio from the Bank of Italy 
may have been the decisive influences on the measures undertaken to promote financial 
liberalization. 
Tajikistan  
53.       Throughout the evaluation period, Tajikistan’s banking system was small and vulnerable, 
with levels of intermediation and private-sector credit that were low relative to GDP even by 
regional standards; high interest-rate spreads; and low confidence in the system. By the end of 
the period, nonperforming loans were relatively high by international standards, and provisioning 22 
looked insufficient. Despite amendments to the banking law introduced in 2005 to ease 
restrictions on foreign bank participation, foreign competition in the banking system remained 
limited. Tajikistan ranked rather low on the various international indicators of governance, 
transparency, and doing business.  
54.       Banking sector reform was always high on the reform agenda advocated by the IMF. The 
first IMF-supported program under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)/Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) (1998–2001) included a number of measures and 
benchmarks to lay the foundations for the development of an efficient and solvent banking 
sector. Initial measures focused on strengthening the capital base of the banks to allow them to 
meet prudential requirements, and included the development of a comprehensive bank 
restructuring program (IMF, 1998d). Subsequent reform measures inter alia focused on the 
gradual withdrawal of the central bank from the retail banking business and strengthening of the 
central bank’s banking supervision department (IMF, 1999c; 2000d). In the first review of the 
third-year ESAF/PRGF program, as a structural benchmark for end-June 2001, the Tajik 
authorities agreed to amend legislation to allow average foreign equity ownership of the banking 
system as a whole to increase to a maximum of 40 percent in 2001 and 50 percent in 2002 
(IMF, 2001b).
21 However, the program went off-track after the second review in June 2001. 
55.       The new three-year PRGF-supported program agreed between the IMF and the 
government of Tajikistan in November 2002 included further banking sector reforms. During the 
third program review in July 2004, the Tajik authorities indicated their openness to the entry of 
foreign banks with established expertise, and the central bank requested Fund technical 
assistance to review the legal framework for impediments (such as limits on foreign ownership) 
to the entry of more established foreign banks and to address other deficiencies that limited 
lending opportunities (IMF, 2004c).  
                                                 
21 Tajikistan is one of the few countries whose IMF-supported program(s) contained conditionality related to trade in 
financial services. For other examples, see Annex 2. 23 
56.       During the fourth program review in March 2005, the Tajik authorities committed to 
relax the remaining restrictions on the entry of foreign banks, in particular by eliminating the 
ceiling on foreign capital participation and the requirement that Tajik nationals head banks 
operating in the country (structural benchmark for June 2005) (IMF, 2005e); the benchmark was 
met. A SIP (Fischer, 2005) prepared for the 2004 Article IV consultation (which coincided with 
the fourth program review) analyzed Tajikistan’s banking sector and recommended a number of 
reforms to deepen the sector, including opening the banking system to entry by major 
international banks to obtain access to banking expertise, capital, and increased credibility. The 
paper cited “substantial cross-country evidence” from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2002) associating state ownership of banks with slower subsequent financial 
development, lower growth of per capita income, and lower growth of productivity in the non-
financial sector.
22  
57.       During the fifth and sixth reviews of the PRGF-supported program, IMF staff reported 
that “there was growing interest among foreign banks to operate in Tajikistan” (IMF, 2005f) and 
opined that the approval of the amendments aimed at eliminating restrictions on foreign 
competition would help to strengthen the banking system and improve the quality of financial 
services (IMF, 2006d). But the 2006 Article IV mission found that while the Tajik banking 
sector was stronger, it remained “small and vulnerable” with limited foreign competition despite 
the legal changes introduced late in 2005 (IMF, 2007d). A joint IMF-World Bank FSAP mission 
in 2007 noted that trade in financial services was still at a rudimentary stage—no Tajik banks 
were established outside the country, and only one foreign bank (from Kazakhstan) operated in 
Tajikistan, with a specialized role serving two embassies. However, the FSSA report predicted 
that there would be more foreign bank entry and greater competitive pressure in the coming 
years and advised the central bank to develop the necessary regime to deal with such a scenario, 
including the ability to effectively supervise foreign banks established in Tajikistan (IMF, 2008). 
58.       It seems reasonable to conclude that Fund advice and conditionality in Tajikistan with 
regard to liberalization of trade in financial services were grounded analytically and empirically 
in cross-country studies that had been designed to investigate the benefits of financial 
liberalization and that could be brought to bear on the circumstances and limitations pertinent to 
the Tajik financial sector. However, there was no direct evidence in the Fund documents on the 
specific barriers that constrained the entry of foreign banks and the impact that reduction and/or 
removal of these barriers would have on the structure and efficiency of the Tajik financial sector 
and the country’s economic welfare. 
                                                 
22 An earlier IMF working paper by De Nicolo, Geadah, and Rozhkov (2003) comparing the level of financial 
development between the Commonwealth of Independent States countries (including Tajikistan) and the more 
advanced transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic states also cited the work of La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). The paper observed that the liberalized entry of “fit-and-proper” financial 
firms in the latter group of countries had speeded up rationalization in the provision of financial services and 
increased overall transparency and competition. 24 
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
59.       Based on the broad review of the Fund’s Article IV surveillance activities and the four 
country studies summarized above, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Fund staff were 
generally aware of the benefits of financial liberalization, based on their apparent knowledge of 
the literature and the findings of some of the SIPs on financial liberalization carried out in the 
context of Article IV consultations for individual countries. However, it is doubtful whether the 
Fund’s advice and recommendations on financial liberalization have had much influence. Rather, 
it appears especially in the case studies that the pace and effects of financial liberalization have 
been determined to a large extent by unilateral policy initiatives and by the terms and timing of 
the negotiations for WTO accession. What can be said therefore is that Fund advice in support of 
liberalization can be best interpreted to be in support of country unilateral policy actions and the 
dynamics of the WTO accession process.  
60.       Barriers to trade in financial services are akin to nontariff barriers as applied to trade in 
goods. Measurement of the size and economic effects of these barriers therefore poses 
considerable problems. Since the available international data sources on financial service barriers 
are limited, the Fund could play a useful role, in the course of its surveillance, by encouraging its 
members to identify existing financial services barriers and by providing the modeling expertise 
needed to construct measures of the price and quantity effects of the reducing or removing these 
barriers. The basis for this role may lie in the collaboration by Fund staff with the survey work 
on services barriers now being done by Gootiiz and Mattoo at the World Bank and on the 
methodologies for measuring services barriers that have been developed by Deardorff and 
Stern (2008). The data and measures of existing barriers can be embedded in partial or general 
equilibrium modeling frameworks that can be used to provide a quantitative assessment of the 
economic effects that may be expected if certain liberalization measures were to be adopted. In 
this way, Fund advice would become more precise in character as compared to its usually more 
qualitative and general nature. 25 
ANNEX 1. COVERAGE OF TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES IN IMF SURVEILLANCE 
A.   Article IV Staff Reports 
1.       Annex Table A1.1 summarizes the coverage of trade in financial services issues in all 
Article IV consultations in three sample periods corresponding to 1996, 2000, and 2006. 
Each sample included all Article IV staff reports for that year plus reports for the closest 
earlier year for countries that did not have an Article IV consultation in that particular year. 
For example, the 1996 sample included staff reports for all 143 countries that had 1996 
consultations, plus—for countries that did not have 1996 consultations—35 staff reports from 
1995 consultations and 1 staff report from a 1994 consultation.  
2.       Coverage of trade in financial services issues was classified as: absent (i.e., no 
mention of issues related to trade in financial services in the staff report); factual reporting 
only (e.g., “Trade in services, notably financial services, will be further liberalized under the 
EU single passport regime....”); and advice (i.e., staff expressed a view and/or provided a 
recommendation on one or more issues related to trade in financial services). The review 
considered only coverage related to trade in financial services; coverage of broader financial 
sector reforms was not included unless there was an obvious international aspect to the issue. 
Advice was divided into two categories, depending on whether or not staff’s 
recommendation was supported by underlying analysis found in a SIP or other background 
work. When such support was present, the advice is classified as “deep.” 
3.       Coverage of trade in financial services issues in the staff reports sampled was 
extremely limited. Fewer than 15 percent of the 554 staff reports sampled contained some 
mention of issues related to trade in financial services, with coverage limited to factual 
reporting of the authorities’ actual/intended policies in approximately one-fourth of the cases. 
When given, staff’s advice was mainly to promote competition in the banking/financial 
sector, including, in several cases, by privatizing public banks (with the involvement of 
strategic foreign investors). The staff’s advice on liberalization of trade in financial services 
was rarely backed up by detailed analytical work such as SIPs. 
4.       The breakdown by time period in Annex Table A1.1 shows a slight increase in 
coverage over time, and a shift from factual description toward some form of advice in the 
later periods.  
5.       The breakdown by area departments indicates that the Asia-Pacific Department 
(APD), the European Department (EUR), and the Middle East and Central Asia Department 
(MCD) gave the most advice (or most often expressed a view) on trade in financial services 
issues. These views mostly fell into two groups: 
•  supporting the authorities’ initiatives to liberalize trade and level the playing field for 
domestic and foreign providers of financial services (e.g., in Hong Kong, India, 
Malaysia, Nepal, and Singapore in APD; in Albania, Belarus, Germany, Luxembourg, 
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Moldova, Norway, San Marino, and the Slovak Republic in EUR; and in Algeria, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, Iran, Oman, and Tunisia in MCD)  
•  urging the authorities to liberalize further (e.g., in Laos, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, and Vietnam in APD; in Austria, the Euro Area, Israel, Italy, Poland, and 
Turkey in EUR; and in Armenia, Kuwait, Libya, and Syria in MCD). 
6.       In a number of countries (e.g., Botswana, Brunei, Namibia, and Saint Lucia), staff 
strongly cautioned the authorities against developing offshore financial centers, at least until 
the country’s supervisory and regulatory capabilities were sufficiently strengthened. 
B.   Article IV Background Papers 
7.       Annex Table A1.2 provides a list of selected background papers focusing on trade in 
financial services issues that were prepared for Article IV consultations over the period 
1996–2008. The papers are listed in chronological order. The criterion for inclusion in the 
table is that the paper focuses primarily on, and contains some analysis (either quantitative or 
qualitative) beyond a factual description of, an issue related to trade in financial services. 
Papers on broader financial sector issues (such as the degree of competition in the banking 
system, recent reforms in the financial sector, or bank restructuring following a financial 
crisis) were not included unless there was an obvious international aspect to the issue. This 
rough criterion yielded twenty SIPs along with one background paper for the Baltic 
countries. 
8.        The papers listed in Annex Table A1.2 analyzed the ex ante and ex post effects of 
(liberalizing) trade in financial services on the structure and performance of the financial 
sector and financial supervision. Half of the papers studied the implications of a country’s 
recent or impending liberalization of trade in financial services (e.g., Decressin (1998) for 
Portugal; Schipke and others (2003) for the Baltic countries; Leigh and Podpiera (2006) for 
China); the other half looked at the effects of trade in financial services on a country’s 
financial sector (e.g., Koeva (2002) for India; Lukonga (2006) for South Africa) and 
macroeconomy (e.g., Muhleisen (2003) for Germany, and Klyuev (2007) for Canada).  
9.       More than half of the papers were from the most recent part of the evaluation 
period—2005 or later. Only three were written before 2000. 
10.       More than half of the papers came from EUR where financial integration was an 
especially significant topic during the evaluation period; there were three papers each for the 
Euro Area and Austria. There were also a number of papers from APD (on China, India, 
Japan, and Singapore) though none of the analysis seems to have been reflected in staff 
views/advice on trade in financial services in the Article IV reports for those countries 
sampled in Annex Table A1.1.  
 
Annex Table A1.1. Coverage of Trade in Financial Services Issues in Article IV Consultations
1 
 
Aggregate  Africa (AFR)  Asia-Pacific (APD)  Europe (EUR) 
Middle East and 
Central Asia (MCD) 
Western Hemisphere 
(WHD) 
  1996 2000 2006 1996 2000 2006 1996 2000 2006 1996 2000 2006 1996 2000 2006 1996 2000 2006 
Number  of  staff  reports   180  184  190  43 44 46 32 33 34 43 44 45 28 28 30 34 35 35 
Number  of  staff  reports  containing:                 
No mention of trade in 
financial services  161  160  160  40 40 41 26 25 30 40 38 35 24 26 21 31 31 33 
Factual reporting of trade 
in financial services  10  2 5 3 1 0 3 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 
Views/advice on trade in 
financial services  9  19  24  0 3 5 3 8 2 2 5 9 3 2 8 1 4 1 
Of which: "Deep" 
views/advice
2   1 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Percent  of  staff  reports  containing:                
No mention of trade in 
financial services  89.4 87.0 84.2 93.0 90.9 89.1 81.3 75.8 88.2 93.0 86.4 77.8 85.7 92.9 70.0 91.2 88.6 94.3 
Factual reporting of trade 
in financial services  5.6 1.1 2.6 7.0 2.3 0.0 9.4 0.0 5.9 2.3 2.3 2.2 3.6 0.0 3.3 5.9 0.0 2.9 
Views/advice on trade in 
financial services  5.0 10.3  12.6 0.0  6.8 10.9 9.4 24.2 5.9  4.7 11.4  20.0  10.7 7.1 26.7 2.9 11.4 2.9 
Of which: "Deep" 






1 Includes Article IV staff reports for three territories (Aruba, Hong Kong, and Netherlands Antilles) and four currency unions (CEMAC, ECCU, Euro Area, and WAEMU). 




Annex Table A1.2. Selected SIPs and Background Papers on Trade in Financial Services Issues 





Decressin, Jorg, 1998, “The Portuguese Banking System: Feeling its Pulse on the 
Eve of EMU,” in Portugal—Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, SM/98/243 
Portugal   X  
Drees, Burkhard, 1998, “European and Global Integration: the Challenges for 




Hviding, Ketil, 1999, “Swiss Banking at the Start of the Twenty-First Century: 
Challenges and Opportunities,” Chapter I in Switzerland—Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix, SM/99/31 
Switzerland 
X  
Ubide, Angel, 2000, “Supervising a Largely Foreign-Owned Financial Sector: A 
Sketch of Luxembourg's Approach and Alternative Arrangements,” Chapter IV in 
Luxembourg—Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, SM/97/136 
Luxembourg 
 X 
Hviding, Ketil, 2000, “Challenges of European Financial Integration: The Case of 




Drees, Burkhard, 2002, “Singapore’s Role as a Financial Center in a Changing 
Global Financial System,” Chapter I in Singapore— Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix, SM/02/358 
Singapore 
X  
Koeva, Petya, 2002, "The Performance of Indian Banks During Financial 




Schipke, Alfred, and others, 2003, Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation in 
the Baltic States, SM/03/122 
Baltic countries  X  
Muhleisen, Martin, 2003, “Germany's Financial System— International Linkages 




Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, 2005, "Outward Expansion of Singapore Banks," Chapter II 
in Singapore—Selected Issues, SM/05/22 
Singapore   X 
Haas, Francois, 2005, "The Integration of European Financial Markets," Chapter 
IV in Euro Area Policies—Selected Issues, SM/05/259 
Euro Area  X  
Decressin, Jörg, and Beata Kudela, 2005, "Banks and Markets in Europe and the 
United States," Chapter VI in Euro Area Policies—Selected Issues, SM/05/259 
Euro Area   X 
Nakagawa, Shinobu, 2006, "The Re-emergence of Japanese Banks in Asia," 
Chapter VI in Japan—Selected Issues, SM/06/231 
Japan   X 
Lukonga, Inutu, 2006, "Integration of South African Banks in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—Regulatory and Stability Implications," Chapter V in South Africa—
Selected Issues, SM/06/244 
South Africa  
 X 
Leigh, Lamin, and Richard Podpiera, 2006, "The Rise of Foreign Investment in 




Tieman, Alexander, 2007, “Cross-Border Banking Issues for the Austrian Banks 




Bems, Rudolfs, 2007, “Efficiency of Slovene Banking Sector in the EU Context,” 
Chapter II in Republic of Slovenia—Selected Issues, SM/07/145 
Slovenia  X  
Andritzky, Jochen, 2007, “Bank Risks from Cross-Border Lending and Borrowing 
in Slovenia,” Chapter III in Republic of Slovenia—Selected Issues, SM/07/145 
Slovenia   X 
Haas, François, 2007, "The Market in Financial Instruments Directive and the 
Transformation of Europe’s Capital Markets," Chapter I in Euro Area Policies—
Selected Issues, SM/07/241 
Euro Area 
X  
Klyuev, Vladimir, 2007, “Real Implications of Financial Linkages Between Canada 
and the United States,” Chapter II in Canada—Selected Issues, SM/08/19 
Canada   X 
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C.   Multilateral Surveillance Reports 
11.       Coverage of trade in financial services in multilateral surveillance—the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO), the International Capital Markets Report (ICMR) and its 
successor, the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR)—was scant during the evaluation 
period (Annex Table A1.3). Region-specific coverage was limited to Europe, with the 
exception of a box on trade finance in Sub-Saharan Africa in the April 2009 GFSR. 
Annex Table A1.3. Trade in Financial Services Topics in the WEO, ICMR, and GFSR 
EMU: Systemic Implications and Challenges  Chapter III  International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, November 1997 
European Monetary Union: Institutional Framework for 
Financial Policies and Structural Implications 
Annex IV  International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, November 1997 
Globalization of Finance and Financial Risks  Annex V  International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, September 1998 
Progress with European Monetary Integration  Annex I  International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, September 1999 
The Role of Foreign Banks in Emerging Markets  Chapter VI  International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, September 2000 
Extension of Emerging Market Household Credit by 
Foreign-Owned Banks 
Box 2.1  Global Financial Stability Report: Market 
Developments and Issues, September 2006 
The Globalization of Financial Institutions and Its 
Implication for Financial Stability 
Chapter III  Global Financial Stability Report: Market 
Developments and Issues, April 2007 
Cross-Border Exposures and Financial Interlinkages 
within Europe 
Box 1.2  Global Financial Stability Report: Market 
Developments and Issues, April 2009 
Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Trade Finance: 
The Case of Sub-Saharan Africa 
Box 1.3  Global Financial Stability Report: Market 
Developments and Issues, April 2009 
Impact of Foreign Bank Ownership during Home-Grown 
Crises 




ANNEX 2. IMF CONDITIONALITY ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES  
1.       Annex Table A2.1 lists conditions on trade in financial services found in IMF-
supported programs that began during 1996–2007. As before, the criterion for inclusion in 
the table was that the condition had to be related to trade in financial services; conditions 
involving measures to generally reform or liberalize the financial sector or to privatize state 
banks were not included unless they contained an obvious international aspect. Only 
conditions specified as prior actions, structural performance criteria, or structural benchmarks 
were included; other policy measures mentioned in the Memorandum of Economic and 
Financial Policies (MEFP) for the program were not included. This rough criterion yielded 
18 conditions in eleven programs in ten countries. The IMF-supported programs with trade 
conditionality on financial services included Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) (3) as well as 
programs supported by the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) (1) and the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (EFF) and its predecessor, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) (7). 
2.        Almost all the conditions listed in Annex Table A2.1 were introduced in the context 
of reforming the banking/financial system to foster competition and improve efficiency. 
Exceptions were the condition to allow foreign banks and brokerage houses to establish 
subsidiaries in Korea’s 1997 SBA, which was part of a package of capital account 
liberalization measures, and the conditions relating to the licensing of new banks in 
Mongolia’s 2001 PRGF-supported program, which were introduced to improve the 
governance of the banking system. Only one condition related to the liberalization of 
insurance services (in Armenia’s 2006 PRGF-supported program). 
3.       More than half of the conditions were found in IMF-supported programs from the 
earlier part of the evaluation period (before 2000). More than half of the conditions were 
found in PRGF- or ESAF-supported programs, presumably because these programs are more 
likely to contain structural reforms. And except for Egypt and Korea, all the conditions were 













February 1998  • Allow foreign banks and brokerage houses to establish subsidiaries 
(Structural performance criterion). 
IMF, 1998, Republic of Korea—First Quarterly Review Under the 
Stand-By Arrangement (EBS/98/20, Supplement 1) 
Mongolia 
PRGF (2001–05) 
September 2001  • Finalize the Bank of Mongolia’s decision regarding the disposition of 
recent or prospective bank license applications by foreign institutions 
consistent with the MEFP’s stipulation that applicants be limited only 
to the largest and most reputable institutions from countries with 
proven records of effective consolidated supervision (Prior action). 
• Adhere to best international standards for the licensing of new 
banks, including by limiting prospective applicants only to the largest 
and most reputable institutions from countries with proven records of 
effective consolidated supervision, and consult with IMF staff about 
the appropriate interpretation of these standards when considering 
applications for new bank licenses (Structural benchmark). 
IMF, 2001, Mongolia—Request for a Three-Year Arrangement 
Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (EBS/01/166) 
Lao P.D.R. 
PRGF (2001–05) 
August 2003  • Submit to the Standing Committee of the National Assembly 
amendments to the Decree Law on Commercial Banks that equalize 
the capital requirements for banks with domestic and foreign 
shareholders (with state commercial banks’ capital requirements 
linked to their restructuring progress) and permit foreign bank 
branches to operate on a nationwide basis (Structural benchmark). 
IMF, 2003, Lao People’s Democratic Republic—Third Review 
Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Requests for 





August 1997  • Eliminate licensing requirements for foreign borrowing by 
individuals and enterprises (Prior action).  
• Allow foreigners to buy seats at the commodity exchanges (Prior 
action). 
IMF, 1997, Ukraine—Staff Report for the 1997 Article IV 
Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement 
(EBS/97/144) 
Albania 
ESAF (1998–2001)  
April 1998  • Savings Bank to agree on governance contract allowing 
participation with foreign bank in management (Prior action).  
• Appoint foreign CEO for National Commercial Bank (Prior action).  
IMF, 1998, Albania—Staff Report for the 1998 Article IV 
Consultation and Request for Arrangements Under the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (EBS/98/17) 
Albania 
PRGF/EFF (2006–09) 
June 2007  • Allow nonbank foreign and domestic institutional investors full 
access to primary auctions—on a competitive basis—for all 
government securities (Structural benchmark).  
IMF, 2006, Albania—Third Review Under the Three-Year 
Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, 























was included  Condition(s)   Reference 
MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA 
Egypt 
SBA (1996–98) 
September 1996  • Eliminate the 49 percent limit to foreign ownership of joint venture 
banks (Prior action).  
IMF, 1996, Arab Republic of Egypt—Staff Report for the 1996 
Article IV Consultation and Request for Stand-By Arrangement 
(EBS/96/ 149) 
December 1997  • Issue an Azerbaijan National Bank (ANB) regulation allowing 
foreign banks and non-residents, in addition to all residents, to 
participate directly in the primary and secondary treasury bill 
markets, as well as interbank money market (the latter applies to 
foreign banks only) (Prior action for second review). 
• Allow foreign banks to participate in ANB credit auctions (Structural 
benchmark). 
IMF, 1997, Azerbaijan Republic—Request for the Second Annual 
Arrangement Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, 





January 1999  • Complete bank restructuring measures, including participation of a 
foreign strategic investor in the International Bank and 
implementation of the Prominvestbank twinning arrangement (Prior 
action for third-year ESAF/EFF program). 
• Invite foreign banks to raise up to 30 percent of banking system 
capital (Structural benchmark). 
IMF, 1999, Azerbaijan Republic—Request for the Third Annual 
Arrangement Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, 
Fourth Review under the Extended Arrangement, and Use of Fund 
Resources-Request for Purchase Under the Compensatory and 
Contingency Financing Facility (EBS/99/1) 
Kazakhstan 
EFF (1996–99) 
June 1998  • Adopt by mid-June 1998, and undertake to submit to parliament no 
later than September 1998, an amendment to the banking law which 
will increase the limit on foreign-owned banks’ share in aggregate 
capital of the commercial banking sector from 25 percent to 50 
percent by end-1998 (Prior action for fourth review). 
• Adoption by parliament of amendment to the banking law which 
increases the limit on foreign-owned banks' share in aggregate 
capital of the commercial banking sector from 25 percent to 50 
percent from end-1998 (Structural benchmark). 
IMF, 1998, Republic of Kazakhstan—Staff Report for the 1998 
Article IV Consultation, Fourth Review Under the Extended 




March 2001  • Amend legislation to allow average foreign equity ownership of the 
banking system as a whole to increase to a maximum of 40 percent 
in 2001 and 50 percent in 2002. (Structural benchmark). 
IMF, 2001, Republic of Tajikistan—Staff Report for the 2001 Article 
IV Consultation, First Review Under the Third Annual Arrangement 
Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, and Request for 
Waiver and Modification of Performance Criteria (EBS/01/46) 
Tajikistan 
PRGF (2002–06) 
February 2005  • Remove the regulatory limits on foreign capital in the banking 
system and the requirement for a Tajik citizen to head commercial 
banks in the Banking Law (Structural benchmark). 
IMF, 2005, Republic of Tajikistan—Staff Report for the 2004 Article 
IV Consultation and Fourth Review Under the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (EBS/05/38) 
Armenia 
PRGF (2005–08) 
April 2006  • Submit to Parliament an amendment to the Law on Insurance that 
eliminates the limitations on the range of services that insurance 
companies with substantial foreign ownership (above 49 percent of 
capital) can provide in Armenia (Structural performance criterion). 
IMF, 2005, Republic of Armenia—Second Review Under the 
Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criterion 
(EBS/06/65) 
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ANNEX 3. IMF WORKING PAPERS AND EXTERNAL RESEARCH ON  
TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
1.       Annex Table A3.1 lists 18 IMF working papers from 1996–2008 with a focus on 
trade in financial services. The inclusion criterion is whether the main focus of the paper was 
on some aspect of trade in financial services, narrowly defined as in the earlier annexes; both 
empirical and theoretical papers are included. Working papers that are closely based on SIPs 
listed in Annex Table A1.2 are not included in this table to avoid double-counting.  
2.       The papers—the majority of which were written before 2000—fall into three broad 
categories:  
•  Three early (1997–2003) papers sought to clarify the main issues in trade in financial 
services and their implications for IMF work.  
•  Four papers analyzed—mainly qualitatively—prospects for (further) liberalization of 
trade in financial services in Central Africa, Central America, the Maghreb countries, 
and West Africa.  
•  The rest of the papers focused on the effects of liberalizing trade in financial services, 
from both an ex ante and ex post perspective.  
3.       Working papers in the third group were mostly empirical studies based on cross-
country data or individual country cases (e.g., Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (1999) on 
Colombia; Detragiache and Gupta (2004) on Malaysia). The papers analyzed the effects of 
foreign banks on bank behavior (e.g., Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar, 1999; Cihak and 
Podpiera, 2005; and Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta, 2006); financial sector stability 
(e.g., Kireyev, 2002b; Valckx, 2002; and Arena, Reinhard, and Vazquez, 2006); capital flows 
(Tamirisa, 1999); credit growth (Aydin, 2008); and financial supervision (e.g., Song, 2004; 
and Hardy and Nieto, 2008). 
4.       The amount of IMF research on trade in financial services issues, as proxied by the 
number of IMF working papers on this topic, is surprisingly small given the centrality of 
financial sector issues in the IMF’s operational work. The quality of the empirical work is, 
for the most part, reasonably high, with a number of the papers having been subsequently 
published in refereed journals. Of particular note are Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar (1999) and 
Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2006) which were published in the Journal of Development 
Economics and the Journal of Finance respectively, and whose findings have been widely 
cited.
23 
                                                 
23 Annex Table A3.2 provides a list of selected external publications and working papers on topics related to 
trade in financial services, broadly defined to include general financial sector liberalization.  
  
 
Annex Table A3.1. Selected Working Papers on Trade in Financial Services Issues 
  Country/ Region  Methodology   Main Conclusions  
Understanding trade in financial services and its implications for the IMF   
Sorsa, Piritta, 1997, "The GATS Agreement 
on Financial Services: A Modest Start to 
Multilateral Liberalization," WP/97/55 (May) 
 Qualitative  analysis  In many countries, multilaterally liberalized financial sector policies are more restrictive 
than the actual state of openness or development of financial sectors. Many emerging 
markets liberalized little under the GATS despite often well-developed financial markets, 
while the opposite was true in some less developed developing countries. 
Tamirisa, Natalia, and others, 2000, "Trade 
Policy in Financial Services," WP/00/31 
(February) 
 Qualitative  analysis  Trade liberalization could complement other financial reforms by enhancing the efficiency, 
quality, and variety of financial services and by encouraging improvement of financial 
regulations and practices. However, it raises sectoral, strategic, and cultural concerns. The 
design of trade policy should therefore emphasize the nexus with the macroeconomic 
framework and other financial sector policies, especially prudential and capital account 
regulations. It should also differentiate between types of trade.  
Lehmann, Alexander, Natalia Tamirisa, and 
Jaroslaw Wieczorek, 2003, "International 
Trade in Services: Implications for the 
Fund," PDP/03/6 (December) 
 Qualitative  analysis  Further liberalization of services trade in developing countries, as currently envisaged in 
the context of the WTO Doha Development Agenda, holds a number of potential benefits, 
such as underpinning the liberalization of goods trade, but it is also being resisted due to 
its potential adjustment costs. Two implications for IMF activities are examined: coherence 
among the three principal international economic institutions and sequencing with 
macroeconomic stabilization and regulatory reforms. 
Assessing prospects for liberalization of trade in financial services 
Canales Kriljenko, Jorge Iván, Padamja 
Khandelwal, and Alexander Lehmann, 
2003, "Financial Integration in Central 
America: Prospects and Adjustment 






Qualitative analysis  Even though there are few formal barriers to trade in financial services in the six Central 
American Free Trade Area (CAFTA) countries, deficiencies in regulatory and competition 
standards and in the judicial systems still restrict the participation of foreign institutions in 
the financial systems in the region. A greater presence of such institutions could support 
other objectives of trade and investment liberalization, though it would require several 
adjustments in prudential supervision at national levels and greater cooperation between 
members of the CAFTA. 
Sy, Amadou N.R., 2006, "Financial 
Integration in the West African Economic 






Qualitative analysis  The structure of the financial sector and its institutional arrangements indicate that financial 
integration is well advanced in some aspects. Common and foreign ownership of banks is 
very high and cross-border transactions are frequent in the government securities markets; 
common institutions help achieve a high degree of similarity of rules. There is nonetheless 
scope for further financial integration as indicated by persistent deviations from the law of 
one price, limited cross-border bank transactions, and differences in treatment.  
Saab, Samer Y., and Jérôme Vacher, 2007, 
"Banking Sector Integration and 






There is some evidence of price convergence in average interest rate spreads. However, 
this observation is not supported by an increase in cross-border flows in retail loans and 
deposits, and price convergence may merely reflect excess liquidity in the region. Other 
data also indicate that bank competition within the CEMAC as a region is limited, 
complementing the findings on integration. Addressing shortfalls in legal and regulatory 
frameworks, infrastructure, and markets would facilitate integration. 
Tahari, Amor, and others, 2007, "Financial 
Sector Reforms and Prospects for Financial 





Qualitative analysis  So far, only limited actions and progress have been made toward financial integration 
within the Maghreb region. Useful lessons can be garnered from the experiences of the 
European Union and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, including: (a) adopting a gradual 
approach; (b) consolidating macroeconomic stability in all the countries; (c) strengthening 
financial markets; (d) harmonizing rules and regulations(e) improving regional coordination; 










Annex Table A3.1. Selected Working Papers on Trade in Financial Services Issues (continued) 
  Country/ Region  Methodology   Main Conclusions  
Effects and implications of liberalizing trade in financial services 
Tamirisa, Natalia, 1999, "Trade in Financial 
Services and Capital Movements," 
WP/99/89 (July) 
OECD countries  Econometric 
analysis 
Capital inflows tend to fall (rise) with the liberalization of commercial presence in banking 
and securities (insurance) services, possibly reflecting an increase (decrease) in saving. 
When cross-border trade is liberalized, capital flows change insignificantly. 
Barajas, Adolfo, Roberto Steiner, and 
Natalia Salazar, 1999, "Foreign Investment 
in Colombia's Financial Sector," WP/99/150 
(November) 
Colombia  Econometric 
analysis 
Financial liberalization in general had a beneficial impact on bank behavior in Colombia. 
Although the positive contribution of foreign entry may be overstated in recent studies by 
not controlling for other liberalization factors, foreign (and domestic) entry beginning in 
1990 did improve bank behavior by enhancing operative efficiency and competition. 
However, this came at the expense of deterioration in the loan quality of domestic banks. 
Kireyev, Alexei, 2002a, "Liberalization of 
Trade in Financial Services and Financial 
Sector Stability (Analytical Approach)," 
WP/02/138 (August) 
 Qualitative  analysis  Liberalization of trade in financial services undertaken by countries under the WTO has 
generally been conducive to the stability of their financial systems because of the mutually 
reinforcing nature of existing international rules and practices.  
Kireyev, Alexei, 2002b, "Liberalization of 
Trade in Financial Services and Financial 
Sector Stability (Empirical Approach)," 
WP/02/139 (August) 
92 countries  Econometric 
analysis 
Econometric testing of indicators intended to proxy financial sector stability—subdivided 
into exchange rate and banking sector stability—suggests that opening of the financial 
sector is an efficient policy instrument for achieving a variety of macroeconomic goals. 
While liberalization is found to be broadly conducive to stability, the outcome of 
liberalization on exchange rate stability is less predictable than on banking sector stability. 
Valckx, Nico, 2002, "WTO Financial 
Services Commitments: Determinants and 
Impact on Financial Stability," WP/02/214 
(December) 
92 countries  Econometric 
analysis 
The most important factors that have influenced WTO members to take on their chosen 
level of liberalization commitments in the framework of liberalization of trade in financial 
services are economic growth, current account, trends in banking sector development, 
policy restrictiveness, and peer group effects. More liberal commitments may be 
associated with greater vulnerability to currency and banking crises—most likely a short-
term effect, which should be mitigated with time through increased market efficiency and 
better resource allocation. 
Song, Inwon, 2004, "Foreign Bank 
Supervision and Challenges to Emerging 
Market Supervisors," WP/04/82 (May) 
  Qualitative analysis, 
case studies 
As the presence of foreign-owned banks grows, the challenges for emerging market 
supervisors include: (i) choosing a licensing policy for foreign banks; (ii) monitoring the 
local establishments of large international banks; (iii) upgrading their supervisory capacity 
to oversee complicated financial products of foreign banks; (iv) dealing with the issue of 
the parent bank support in case of difficulties or crises; (v) handling consolidated 
supervision if the market is heavily dependent on foreign banks; (vi) dealing with bank 
holding companies or other complex financial institutions; (vii) dealing with increased 
concentration in the banking system; and (viii) improving the governance structure of 
complex international banking groups. 
Detragiache, Enrica, and Poonam Gupta, 
2004, "Foreign Banks in Emerging Market 
Crises: Evidence from Malaysia," 
WP/04/129 (July) 
Malaysia  Econometric 
analysis 
Foreign banks not specialized in Asia performed better than banks mainly active in Asia 
(including all domestic and some foreign banks) during the crisis, maintaining higher 
profitability thanks to higher interest margins and lower nonperforming loans. Foreign 
banks did not abandon the local market during the crisis and received less government 
support than domestic institutions. 
Cihák, Martin, and Richard Podpiera, 2005, 
"Bank Behavior in Developing Countries: 






International banks are generally more efficient and more active in lending than domestic 
banks. Hence, there is no support for the argument that the presence of large international 
banks would have an adverse effect on the effectiveness and efficiency of banking sectors 
in developing countries. However, as suggested by the Kenyan experience, the presence 
of international banks may not lead to increased competition and provision of banking 

















Annex Table A3.1. Selected Working Papers on Trade in Financial Services Issues (concluded) 
  Country/ Region  Methodology   Main Conclusions  
Detragiache, Enrica, Thierry Tressel, and 
Poonam Gupta, 2006, "Foreign Banks in 
Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence," 
WP/06/18 (January) 
89 countries  Theoretical model, 
Econometric 
analysis 
The theoretical model shows that when foreign banks are better at monitoring high-end 
customers than domestic banks, their entry benefits those customers but may hurt other 
customers and worsen welfare. The model also predicts that credit to the private sector 
should be lower in countries with more foreign bank penetration. In both cross-sectional 
and panel tests, a stronger foreign bank presence is robustly associated with less credit to 
the private sector in poor countries. In countries with more foreign bank penetration, credit 
growth is slower and there is less access to credit. There are no adverse effects of foreign 
bank presence in more advanced countries. 
Arena, Marco, Carmen Reinhart, and 
Francisco Vázquez, 2006, "The Lending 
Channel in Emerging Economies: Are 
Foreign Banks Different?" WP/07/48 
(March) 




There is weak evidence that foreign banks have a lower sensitivity of credit to monetary 
conditions relative to their domestic competitors, with the differences driven by banks with 
lower asset liquidity and/or capitalization. The lending and deposit rates of foreign banks 
tend to be smoother during periods of financial distress. However, the differences across 
domestic and foreign banks do not appear to be strong. These results provide weak 
support to the existence of supply-side effects in credit markets and suggest that foreign 
bank entry in emerging countries may have contributed somewhat to stability in credit 
markets. 
De Nicoló, Gianni, and Elena Loukoianova, 
Elena, 2007, "Bank Ownership, Market 






The positive and significant relationship between bank concentration and bank risk of 
failure is stronger when bank ownership is taken into account, and it is strongest when 
state-owned banks have sizeable market shares. Conditional on country and firm specific 
characteristics, the risk profiles of foreign (state-owned) banks are significantly higher than 
(not significantly different from) those of private domestic banks. Private domestic banks 
do take on more risk as a result of larger market shares of both state-owned and foreign 
banks. The model rationalizes this evidence if both state-owned and foreign banks have 
either larger screening and/or lower bankruptcy costs than private domestic banks, banks' 
differences in market shares, screening or bankruptcy costs are not too large, and loan 
markets are sufficiently segmented across banks of different ownership. 
Cihák, Martin, and Li Lian Ong, 2007, 
"Estimating Spillover Risk Among Large EU 
Banks," WP/07/267 (November) 
European Union  Econometric 
analysis 
Spillovers within domestic banking systems generally remain more likely than cross-border 
spillovers among major EU banks. But the number of significant cross-border links is 
already larger than the number of significant links among domestic banks, adding a piece 
of empirical evidence supporting the need for strong cross-border supervisory cooperation 
within the EU. 
Aydın, Burcu, 2008, "Banking Structure and 
Credit Growth in Central and Eastern 
European Countries," WP/08/215 
(September) 





CEE countries depend on foreign banks, and these foreign banks depend on interbank 
funding. Lending by foreign banks seems driven by economic growth and interest rate 
margins. This lending appears independent of economic but not financial conditions in the 
foreign bank’s home country. 
Hardy, Daniel, and Maria Nieto, 2008, 
"Cross-Border Coordination Of Prudential 
Supervision And Deposit Guarantees," 
WP/08/283 (December) 
European Union  Qualitative analysis, 
theoretical model 
The first best approach is to simultaneously strengthen prudential supervision and limit 
depositor protection. However, each country has an incentive to “free ride” on the 
strengthened supervision of others, so an enforcement mechanism such as mutual 
evaluations is needed. Strengthening coordinated prudential regulation and supervision is 
valuable even if deposit guarantee schemes are not well coordinated. Consideration 
should be given to establishing not only a minimum level of deposit guarantee coverage, 




Annex Table A3.2. An Annotated Bibliography of the Economic Determinants and Effects of Financial Services Liberalization 
  Main Conclusions  
Barajas, Adolfo, Roberto Steiner, and Natalia 
Salazar, 2000, “The Impact of Liberalization 
and Foreign Investment in Colombia's Financial 
Sector,” Journal of Development Economics, 
Vol. 63 (1), pp. 157–196. 
This study analyzes financial liberalization measures undertaken in 1990, of which an opening to foreign investment was a major 
component. After a brief description of the major changes in legislation on foreign investment, the performance of foreign-owned vs. 
domestic banks is compared, first using a descriptive approach, then in a more systematic manner using econometric analysis. Panel 
data estimations reveal that financial liberalization in general had a beneficial impact on bank behavior in Colombia, by increasing 
competition, lowering intermediation costs and improving loan quality. Although the positive contribution of foreign entry may be 
overstated in recent studies by not controlling for other liberalization factors, foreign and domestic entry beginning in 1990 did improve 
bank behavior by enhancing operative efficiency and competition. However, the greater competition may have resulted in increased 
risk and a subsequent deterioration in loan quality, particularly among domestic banks. 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Maria 
Soledad Martinez Peria, 2008, “Banking 
Services for Everyone? Barriers to Bank 
Access and Use around the World,” The World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 22 (3),  
pp. 397–430. 
Using information from 193 banks in 58 countries, the authors develop and analyze indicators of physical access, affordability and 
eligibility barriers to deposit, loan and payment services. They find substantial cross-country variation in barriers to banking and show 
that in many countries these barriers can potentially exclude a significant share of the population from using banking services. 
Correlations with bank- and country-level variables show that bank size and the availability of physical infrastructure are the most 
robust predictors of barriers. Further, they find evidence that in more competitive, open, and transparent economies, and in countries 
with better contractual and informational frameworks, banks impose lower barriers. Finally, though foreign banks themselves seem to 
charge higher fees than other banks, in foreign-dominated banking systems, fees are lower, and it is easier to open bank accounts 
and to apply for loans. On the other hand, in systems that are predominantly government-owned, customers pay lower fees but also 
face greater restrictions in terms of where to apply for loans and how long it takes to have applications processed. These findings 
have important implications for policy reforms to broaden access. 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, Emilia, and Daniel C. 
Hardy, 2005, “Financial Sector Liberalization, 
Bank Privatization, and Efficiency: Evidence 
from Pakistan,” Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 29 (8-9), pp. 2381–2406. 
The Pakistani banking system has been transformed over the past 15 years through liberalization, the entry of private banks, the 
privatization of public-sector banks, and the tightening of prudential regulations. The effects of these changes on bank productivity and 
relative efficiency are investigated using various techniques. Bank productivity in terms of profits has increased, and new entrants 
have been efficient, but the dispersion of efficiency remains wide. The privatized banks improved their profit efficiency in the period 
immediately following their privatization, but in the subsequent years only one significantly improved its efficiency, whereas the other 
did not differentiate itself in terms of efficiency from the remaining state-owned banks. The new private domestic banks generally 
proved to be among the most efficient, and sometimes out-performed the foreign banks. 
Bonin, John P., Iftekhar Hasan, and Paul 
Wachtel, 2005, “Privatization Matters: Bank 
Efficiency in Transition Countries,” Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 29 (8-9),  
pp. 2155–78. 
To investigate the impact of bank privatization in transition countries, the authors take the largest banks in six relatively advanced 
countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Income and balance sheet characteristics 
and efficiency measures computed from stochastic frontiers are compared across four bank ownership types. The empirical results 
support the hypotheses that foreign-owned banks are most efficient and government- owned banks are least efficient. In addition, the 
importance of attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization process is confirmed. However, counter to the conjecture that 
foreign banks cherry pick the most profitable opportunities, the authors find that domestic banks have a local advantage in pursuing 
fee-for-service business. Finally, they show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter to performance; specifically, 
voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks, 
even though there is no evidence of a selection effect. 
Boubakri, Narjess, Jean-Claude Cosset, and 
Klaus Fischer, 2005. “Privatization and Bank 
Performance in Developing Countries,” Journal 
of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29 (8-9),  
pp. 2015–41. 
The authors examine the post-privatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries. The results suggest that: (i) On 
average, banks chosen for privatization have lower economic efficiency, and lower solvency than banks kept under government 
ownership. (ii) In the post-privatization period, profitability increases but, depending on the type of owner, efficiency, risk exposure and 
capitalization may worsen or improve. However, (iii) over time, privatization yields significant improvements in economic efficiency and 
credit risk exposure. (iv) Newly privatized banks that are controlled by local industrial groups become more exposed to credit risk and 
interest rate risk after privatization. 
Claessens, Stijn, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
Harry Huizinga, 2001, “How Does Foreign Entry 
Affect Domestic Banking Markets?” Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 25 (5), pp. 891–911. 
Using 7900 bank observations from 80 countries for the 1988–95 period, this paper examines the extent and effect of foreign 
presence in domestic banking markets. The authors investigate how net interest margins, overhead, taxes paid, and profitability differ 
between foreign and domestic banks. They find that foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries, 
but the opposite is the case for developed countries. Estimated results suggest that an increased presence of foreign banks is 
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Claessens, Stijn, and Jong-Kun Lee, 2002, 
“Foreign Banks in Low-Income Countries: 
Recent Developments and Impacts,” 
Background paper commissioned for the Global 
Development Finance (Washington: The World 
Bank). 
As in many other countries, foreign participation in low-income countries’ banking systems has increased in the last decade, although 
from a low level. The authors show that the increased foreign bank participation combined with a commitment to open markets has 
improved the efficiency and competitiveness of these countries’ financial systems. Foreign banks have also introduced improved risk 
management practices and “imported” supervision from parent country regulators, thereby helping to strengthen banking systems. At 
the same time, increased competition may lower franchise value of incumbent banks and can lead to financial instability. While 
adequate regulation and supervision would be the natural policy response, many low-income countries have had great difficulty in 
establishing good legal and institutional frameworks. The answer might be to harness more the benefits of foreign entry, while 
focusing institutional efforts on a few key aspects. 
Clarke, George R.G., Robert Cull, and Mary M. 
Shirley, 2005, “Bank Privatization in Developing 
Countries: A Summary of Lessons and 
Findings,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 
29 (8-9), pp. 1905–1930. 
Although a large and growing literature shows that privatization can improve the performance of non-financial enterprises, there is less 
evidence on how it affects the performance of the banking sector. This paper summarizes the results from the papers in the special 
issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance on bank privatization. It concludes that although bank privatization usually improves bank 
efficiency, gains are greater when the government fully relinquishes control, when banks are privatized to strategic investors, when 
foreign banks are allowed to participate in the privatization process, and when the government does not restrict competition. 
Crystal, Jennifer S., B.Gerard Dages, and Linda 
S. Goldberg, 2001, “Does Foreign Ownership 
Contribute to Sounder Banks? The Latin 
American Experience,” in Open Doors: Foreign 
Participation in Financial Systems in 
Developing Countries, ed. by Robert E. Litan, 
Paul Masson, and Michael Pomerleano 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution). 
The study concluded that the entry of foreign banks had positive effects on the overall soundness of local banking systems partly 
because foreign banks screened and treated problem loans more aggressively. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Ross Levine, and H.G. 
Min, 1998, “Opening to foreign banks: Issues of 
stability, efficiency, and growth,” in The 
Implications of Globalization of World Financial 
Markets, ed. by S. Lee (Seoul: Bank of Korea). 
This study investigated the effects of foreign bank presence in 80 countries between 1988 and 1995. They found that liberalizing 
restrictions on foreign bank entry accelerated the efficiency of the domestic banking sector, and thereby contributed to long-run 
economic growth. 
Francois, Joseph F., and Felix Eschenbach, 
2002, “Financial Sector Competition, Services 
Trade, and Growth,” Working Paper  
TI 2002-089/2 (Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute). 
The authors explore dynamic linkages between financial/banking sector openness, financial sector competition, and growth. They first 
develop an analytical model, highlighting links between long-run economic performance and services trade, through scale economies 
and market and cost structures in the financial services sector. This is followed by an econometric exercise based on data for 130 
countries for the 1990s. The results point to a strong positive relationship between financial sector competition/performance and 
financial sector openness (meaning foreign bank access to domestic markets), and between growth and financial sector 
competition/performance. They also point to the presence of scale economies in the sector. 
Kiyota, Kozo, Barbara Peitsch, and Robert M. 
Stern, 2009, "The Benefits of Financial Sector 
Liberalisation for Developing Countries: A Case 
Study of Ethiopia," OECD Journal of Investment 
Policy, forthcoming. 
This paper focuses on issues of financial sector liberalization in Ethiopia, with reference in particular to the Ethiopian banking sector. 
The results of the micro-data analysis of the Ethiopian banking system suggested that the costs of public banks were 1.6 percent 
higher than those of private banks, and that the public banks appeared to be less efficient than private banks. Also, the interest-rate 
spread was 1.5 percentage points smaller for public banks than private banks. These results suggest that, if foreign banks were 
permitted to enter into the Ethiopian economy, there would likely be a narrowing of the efficiency gap and interest-rate spread 
between the public and private banks and a consequent improvement in Ethiopia’s national economic welfare. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Andrei Shleifer, 2002. “Government 
Ownership of Banks,” Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 57 (1), pp. 265–301. 
The authors assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and 
pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial system, interventionist and inefficient 
governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower 
subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports “political” theories 
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Levine, Ross, Norman Loayza, and Thorsten 
Beck, 2000, “Financial Intermediation and 
Growth: Causality and Causes,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol. 46 (1), pp. 31–77. 
This paper evaluates: (1) whether the exogenous component of financial intermediary development influences economic growth, and 
(2) whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems (e.g., creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting 
standards) explain differences in the level of financial development. Using traditional cross-section, instrumental variable procedures 
and recent dynamic panel techniques, the authors find that the exogenous components of financial intermediary development are 
positively associated with economic growth. Also, the data show that cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help 
account for differences in financial development. Together, these findings suggest that legal and accounting reforms that strengthen 
creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices can boost financial development and accelerate economic growth. 
Lewis, Peter, and Howard Stein, 1997. “Shifting 
Fortunes: The political Economy of Financial 
Liberalization in Nigeria,” World Development, 
Vol. 25 (1), pp. 5–22. 
On the recommendation of the World Bank, Nigeria began to liberalize its financial sector in 1986. Contrary to the prediction of 
financial repression theory, savings and investment declined in the wake of banking deregulation. By 1995, the Nigerian financial 
system was in a state of collapse. The paper locates the main failure of Nigeria’s financial deregulation in the political and institutional 
setting of reform. The institutional mechanisms needed to supervise and regulate banking under the new system were absent while 
private sector banking capacities were weak. Moreover, financial liberalization was quickly captured by a clientelist state as a means 
of reallocating rents to strategic constituents. An additional precipitating factor was macroeconomic instability. The paper points to the 
importance of incorporating political and institutional variables into any model of financial reform or transformation. 
Mattoo, Aaditya, Randeep Rathindran, and 
Arvind Subramanian, 2006, “Measuring 
Services Trade Liberalization and Its Impact on 
Economic Growth: An Illustration,” Journal of 
Economic Integration, Vol. 21 (1), pp. 64–98. 
The authors explain how the output growth effect from liberalizing the service sectors differs from the effect from liberalizing trade in 
goods. They also suggest using a policy-based rather than outcome-based measure of the openness of a country's services regime. 
They construct such openness for two key service sectors: basic telecommunications and financial services. They provide some 
econometric evidence relatively strong for the financial sector and less strong, but nevertheless statistically significant, for the 
telecommunications sector that openness in services influences long-run growth performance. Their estimated measures suggest that 
growth rates in countries with fully open telecommunications and financial services sectors are up to 1.5 percentage points higher 
than those in other countries. 
Mohieldin, Mahmoud, and Sahar Nasr, 2007, 
“On Bank Privatization: The Case of Egypt,” 
The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, Vol. 46 (5), pp. 707–725. 
This paper discusses the controversy regarding the privatization of the banking sector in Egypt. It provides an overview of the 
structure and evolution of the banking system, in the context of the series of reform measures undertaken by the Egyptian authorities 
over the past decades. The paper assesses the performance of the state-owned banks versus private banks over the period 1995–
2005. Micro-prudential indicators, such as capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and profitability, reveal that state-owned banks 
lag behind in terms of efficiency and performance, compared to their private counterparts. Results also suggest that retaining 
government ownership can adversely affect bank performance. The paper explores the factors hindering the smooth implementation 
of bank privatization. The authors indicate that the financial sector reform currently adopted is comprehensive; however it is 
confronted with various political, social, and economic risks, which raise concerns regarding its sustainability. The paper then draws 
on the existing literature to provide guidance to policy makers, regarding effective and successful implementation of bank privatization.
Nannyonjo, Justine, 2001, “Financial Sector 
Reforms in Uganda (1990-2000): Interest Rate 
Spreads, Market Structure, Bank Performance 
and Monetary Policy” (Göteborg: Göteborg 
University). 
This paper outlines the process of and experience with financial sector reforms in Uganda during the period, 1990–2000. It indicates 
that although reform measures led to encouraging results in terms of increasing monetization and achieving a steady real GDP growth 
in a stable macroeconomic environment, performance of the financial system fell short of expectations in other respects. This was 
evidenced by a number of developments: wide spreads between lending and deposit rates, low profitability and poor asset portfolios 
of commercial banks, excess reserves, incidents of liquidity/solvency problems and bank closures. Competition within the financial 
system does not appear to have improved as expected either while concentration of the market persisted. Consequently, the 
implementation of monetary policy remained constrained due to weaknesses in the financial sector. 
Obadan, Mike I., 2006, “Globalization of 
Finance and the Challenge of National 
Financial Sector Development,” Journal of 
Asian Economics, Vol. 17 (2), pp. 316–32. 
Against the background of the significant acceleration of the pace of financial globalization, this paper examines the features of the 
phenomenon and the challenges they pose for national financial sector development. Although financial globalization confers notable 
benefits, it also entails huge costs including financial crisis. The factors of weak banking system and poor regulation helped to 
exacerbate the financial crises of the 1990s. The paper, therefore, stresses the need for sound macroeconomic policies, orderly 
liberalization of capital accounts, adequate preparation of national financial systems and meeting other preconditions for countries to 
reap the benefits of financial globalization at minimum costs. 
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